

8-24-6

TR: Iran is to pay
i.e. "red target" as China to Korea
of JCS VN

JCS - Go to the source. (Heard, now!
" " " "
now: Cios:

from Iran taking over the ME
Shiism - Communism

2 enemies: Sunni Shiism

AQ

us.

as before, US sees monolithic

What kind of war was Korea? in reality, really China/SU/VN
Communism: new + civil; but, foreign

John Perloff: [In VN, a "civil war" between VN who not
VN "a civil war" and collaborators.

Contrary to US: there were no "SUN rats";
and no VN who rats, Com or not,
would work for US (albeit)

When the war, to win it.

(But not to China!

an architect, in 1950-60

& give Hst/Marshall credit for not
intervening in 1947-49 in China

But they deserve more for denying MacArthur
expansion in 1950-

Not using war! firing Mera!

TR

Crossing the 38th Parallel was (Dum)
roll-back.

Had Macell: 2) really known the Chinese
would come in?

Banfield
Banks of Brents

and he really not believe all the
intell?

b) did he expect to use nukes?

What guidelines had he been given
on nukes? None? "No nukes"

(I doubt)

TR: Amis cites ^{some official believe wrong} info (McGB?) that

Macell crossed parallel without
approval - actually he did.

What guideline before if he, on nukes.

What if 1st + 5th Marins had been
cut off at Chosin - if Bombs had fallen:
Pakton Pass

→ nukes

Hidden Adm was that SU (or later, China)
would not respond to US for using FU

but that conflicted with Adm declaratory
policy that SU was 2) divine

b) an equal or superior

as the need for an strategic superiority
(of preventing the from getting it) was to keep
the from FS (or FU);

really, one purpose was for (given to HAK) safe use
of FU. - NOW, MUCH SAFER (except for Korea).

US FC will provide our friends to get
nukes;

and our enemies - but we use Comin-prolif

-but they get it from others (at a price).

8-24-6 TR: East: Iran - Learning
Nukes
Prolif

Consider: start with Comin crises - Iran
and lack of Inside data:
Holsten crises

Consider: Herzog in New Yorker
Dyson
Shubert
Hersh

cf. article in NYT on anti-learning

Examples of non-learning
overcome the VN syndrome = VN
undo the learning Iraq
Iran

some "lesson" - don't do it with troops,
without nukes

"unleash the military"

more troops (Iraq)

Iran

more Iran

nukes

GET

Mam says N says in 1985, "No More VNs" - an mistake
was not to return in ODP (nukes? troops?)

Even Thomas + Walter Isaacson

X

TR: see Wire Men: Anderson + McElroy were
egging on McN + McGB (+ Rush) in
1964-65 — "you've got to do it..."

(see Anderson to JFK in Berlin

and C-II

In C-II, JFK/McN thought of themselves as staying
in control, in Berlin + C-II —

but (Anderson) pointing to how the danger
that an escalating process can get out of
control

I think TCS contemplated having a
process that might really get out of
pres' control (from external response or
one's subordinates, pol. ^{will} breakings...)

but I don't think presidents have adapted
this

(see N, as thrust, but he didn't
think of himself as "weakness," as ineffective,
(see April 25, 1972) or losing control —
though he was a drunk (like CBJ:)
(not "ideological")

TR: US intervention in Asia:

In Phils, US was seen as having expelled
the Spaniards — though we replaced them
(What if we had supported the Spanish?)

In Korea, we didn't see as having
supported the Japanese ^{briefly, not like French in VN} → we were able
to establish a separate state in SK, unlike VN.

(In Iraq, we're seen as having supported Saddam,
before we turned on him.

In Iran, we supported the British, vs. Mossadegh